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In March 2021 the International Mine Action Standards Review Board (IMAS RB) adopted by con-sensus a new Technical Note for Mine Action (TNMA): Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for Land Release and Stockpile Destruction Operations.¹ The TNMA detailed new Common Counting Rules 
for land release outputs, identified elements of Context Capture at points of data entry and underlined 
the need for operational staff to prioritize the collection of relevant good quality data. The purpose 
of this article is to set out why the TNMA was developed and explain certain aspects of its content, 
particularly those where prolonged debate was necessary in order to achieve agreement. 
In its most basic form, the TNMA is a list of thirteen suggested oper-
ational KPIs that organizations may wish to consider when designing 
the dashboards they use for operational oversight and management. 
They may also be considered by donors when developing their report-
ing requirements. However, the KPIs are in no way obligatory; they are 
there to be used if considered helpful. The KPIs are disaggregated in 
broad headings, such as Land Release, Planning and Progress, Open 
Burning and Detonation, Safety, Reporting, and Compliance.
The TNMA was subject to prolonged discussion by a Technical 
Working Group (TWG) of the IMAS RB over the course of 2020.2 The 
TWG included representatives from DCA, DDG, FSD, HALO, MAG, 
Mine Action Review, NPA, HI, and UNMAS.3 It debated at length the 
key issues of Common Counting Rules for Land Release outputs and 
Context Capture at the Point of Data Entry.
One example of how individual KPIs are detailed in the TNMA is 
meter squared per explosive ordnance item (m²/EO item).4 This KPI is a 
useful metric when assessing land release operations but, like all KPIs, 
may be subject to misrepresentation. The TNMA tries to present this 
KPI in a way that, while acknowledging how it may be misused, dem-
onstrates how it can be used well. Firstly, the importance of situating 
the KPI in context is emphasized. For a typical m²/EO item KPI such 
as meter square per anti-personnel mine (m²/AP mine), the meters 
squared might very well be quite low when clearing dense minefields 
in a country like Sri Lanka, and quite high when clearing nuisance/
low density minefields in a country like Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
KPI could tell us equally about the nature of the contamination in a 
country as about the operations there.
Also, this KPI can be used to discern different factors about a given 
land release activity. For example, m²/AP mine can help us understand 
the efficiency of a clearance plan for a pattern minefield. If for a com-
parable site this figure is 20 m²/AP mine, but on the site in question it 
is 200 m²/AP mine, this may imply inefficiency. However, in the same 
scenario, it might also be an indicator of the effectiveness of survey 
and operational planning that targeted the clearance. As with all KPIs, 
m²/EO item does not necessarily lead to hard conclusions, at least not 
immediately. The TNMA emphasizes that analysis of KPIs should 
invariably lead to more questions being asked to understand why a 
given KPI apparently indicates what it does. There might be a number 
of explanations as to why we could see 200 m²/AP mine instead of 20 
m²/AP mine in the clearance of seemingly comparable minefields. It 
could be inefficient clearance or ineffective survey, or another explana-
tion to do with a particular context. The key point is that indicators 
based on “data of a higher quality”5 induce managers to find out why 
and allow us to know and understand our operations better. 
The comparative use of the m²/AP mine KPI for a set of tasks is also 
demonstrated. For example, the dataset in Figure 1 shows a compari-
son of results in one country over different timescales (before 2009 in 
blue, between 2009 and 2012 in red). The red line sits below the blue 
line suggesting that later operations are more “efficient” than ear-
lier ones. A range of influences could be significant: later operations 
could have benefited from initiatives such as the adoption of improved 
concepts and methods of land release that took place around then. 
Additionally, improvements could reflect a general learning curve over 
time as a result of managers repeatedly encountering similar sites and 
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circumstances. Other factors could also explain apparent differences 
in performance. For those conducting operational analysis, draw-
ing on skills similar to those used in the root causes analysis or those 
found in quality and safety management systems may be necessary 
to understand why differences in performance occur and to identify 
appropriate management responses. 
One theme that is emphasized throughout the TNMA is the need for 
good quality data. Unless the data that any KPI is based on is true and 
accurate, the KPI may not only be useless, it can also be misleading. 
Good quality data requires two things initially: well-designed forms 
and operational staff who understand that appropriate data collection 
is an essential part of their job. Forms that capture data, while not over-
burdening field operators, are not as common as we may like to imagine 
in mine action. Typically, it is only feasible to collect a finite amount of 
data about operations. Overambitious levels of data collection can result 
in lower quality data collected. What data is prioritized for collection is 
a choice. Operations managers should be clear about exactly what they 
want to measure and ensure that no superfluous data is collected when 
designing their operational forms. For this reason, design of data forms 
for operations should be led by operations managers. Moreover, all field 
personnel should not only be actively trained in data collection, they 
should use KPIs daily so that analysis becomes a norm and they appre-
ciate the value of the data they collect. In short, if KPIs are relevant and 
help field staff perform better, and if operations managers closely qual-
ity control data collection, field staff will take more care in collecting 
the all-important data that feeds the KPIs in the first place.
The need to try to reflect the context of a given KPI, not least to assist 
in an explanation as detailed in the hypothetical 20 m²/AP mine and 
200 m²/AP mine example discussed previously, is also covered in the 
TNMA. Capturing even basic context will allow those examining data 
with no connection to the operations on the ground—and thus no 
intuitive knowledge of a given context—to under-
stand why a given performance is indicated in cer-
tain KPI figures. However, capturing context at the 
point of data entry is not necessarily straightfor-
ward. For example, hard ground presents a signifi-
cant challenge to manual deminers. How best to 
capture this context in a dataset? Should there be 
basic descriptors such as low, medium, or high and 
in which case how do we make valid comparisons 
if one individual would judge ground hard, but 
another might judge it as medium? Other issues 
include a lack of agreement about what would 
constitute heavy, medium, or low metal contami-
nation. Would the threshold for heavy contamina-
tion be five indications per m² or ten indications? 
Agreement on this proved elusive. The imperfect compromise that 
resulted was just to capture as much context as practical with simple Yes 
or No questions. The TNMA details seventeen context capture ques-
tions that may be used by operators. The unit of measurement is the site 
or polygon as recorded in a task order or clearance plan. Where condi-
tions vary significantly within a given site, the operator may consider 
splitting the site for reporting purposes. Given that conditions change 
as a site is processed, the point of context capture should be the first day 
of Technical Survey (TS) or Clearance.
 
Figure 1. Analysis of m²/AP mine by number of mines at a 
site, including “best fit” curves, Afghanistan pre-2009 in blue, 
2009–2012 in red: Survey Action Center (SAC) Afghanistan 
Database Project 2012; the fact that the red line is lower 
than the blue line implies an increase in average land release 
targeting efficiency within the pre- and post-2009 figures (base 
data provided by the MACCA).
Figure courtesy of David Hewittson.
Figure 2. Demining in saturated ground in 
the Falkland Islands. Capturing Context at the 
Point of Data Entry is difficult to do effectively. 
This TNMA suggests 17 basic context capture 
questions with the demining site/polygon being 
the unit for which context is recorded. 
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Like-for-Like Principle
Analysis of performance invariably entails some form of compari-
son. In order for any comparison to be valid, data is required to be 
collected and reported in the same way: the application of the like-
for-like principle. For example, for KPIs involving time, the unit of 
time must be standardized. The length of a working day can differ 
between organizations and countries, but an hour can be compared 
on a like-for-like basis. The same principle is true for teams, the size of 
which can vary. Thus, it is better to adopt a comparable “unit” such as 
a deminer. As a rule, the lowest common denominated unit should be 
chosen for a given KPI. For these reasons, KPIs such as m²/deminer/
hour are preferred. 
The like-for-like principle becomes more challenging for land 
release outputs. While the key terms “Cancelled,” “Reduced,” and 
“Cleared” were last defined in the most recent editions of IMAS 07.11 
Land Release,6 those definitions were still open to a significant degree 
of interpretation. For example, clearance might entail full excavation 
in a demining lane on one site but be interpreted as only a visual check 
on another. This TNMA aimed to at least try to sharpen the definitions 
Cleared versus Reduced Land
of key land release outputs. While some progress was made, it would be 
wrong to suggest that definitions are now fully clarified. 
Cancelled land is now defined as “Areas designated as a SHA/CHA,7 
or part thereof, which have not been physically processed in any way, 
and meet set cancellation criteria. This includes areas re-designated as 
either SHA/CHA as the task progresses. Cancellation may be done at 
any stage of the LR process.”8,9 The key for such a definition are the can-
cellation criteria, which we are yet to develop in many National Mine 
Action Standards (NMAS) or International Mine Action Standards 
(IMAS). Cleared is now defined as an “area where the organisation has 
applied a process, or processes, to ensure the removal and/or destruc-
tion of all EO hazards from the specified area to the specified depth. 
Where multiple processes are applied to the same area to achieve the 
clearance standard, the area shall only be reported once, although the 
processes that achieved clearance may be recorded in order to reflect 
the accumulated effort applied.”10 What those processes should be 
remains undefined.
The TWG spent a long time debating what constitutes Reduced land. 
A significant sticking point was whether land processed to a clearance 
standard during the course of technical survey could be counted as 
Cleared rather than Reduced. Some operators were adamant that it 
should be, emphasizing the need to record the effort that goes into 
releasing a site. However, this is not necessarily straightforward. For 
example, a grid of lanes is not easy to 
disaggregate as processed to a clear-
ance standard from the areas they 
encompass that are not processed to 
the same standard. This is especially 
true for those demining operators who 
don’t employ Differential GPS when 
surveying progress on their sites. Some 
pointed out that it would be simpler 
to try to maintain these areas as one 
coterminous unit, bounded as a poly-
gon. This view prevailed. Of course, if 
EO is found on-site, inevitably what on 
one day might have been recorded as 
Reduced, by default becomes Cleared. 
For this reason, land release outputs 
should typically reflect the respective 
totals on the last day on site. 
The new definition also empha-
sizes the need to capture exactly what 
was done to land counted as Reduced 
and where it was done: “Within an 
area reported as reduced, organizations shall record clearly where is 
processed and where is not. Area processed shall be further disag-
gregated into those subject to manual, mechanical and ADS process-
ing, with multiple processing of the same area by different assets 
recorded in detail.”11 The Reduced figure is not counted multiple 
times, but the processing, possibly the repeated processing, that 
Figure 3. The edge of a minefield marked by the Iraqi Mine Clearance 
Organisation (IMCO), Iraq. The new TNMA has attempted to add more 
definition on what is Cancelled, Reduced, and Cleared land, albeit full 
definitions will depend on the development of agreed criteria, most 
likely at a national level. 
Image courtesy of Roly Evans.
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produces the figure is different and is captured (most likely in daily 
reporting). In this way it is hoped the effort that goes into releas-
ing a site is recognized, but pitfalls such as multiple counting of the 
same meters squared as released is avoided. Ultimately, at the point 
of handover, the combined meters squared of Cancelled, Reduced, 
and Cleared should equal the surface area of the polygon, with rea-
sonable margins allowed for topography. 
Another issue of significant discussion was how to define clear-
ance; specifically whether the actual removal of an item of EO 
was a requirement for clearance to have taken place. The discus-
sion was based on the need to try to reduce instances where many 
meters squared are reported as cleared without any EO removed. 
A number of operators were adamant that there will always be 
instances of sites that were cleared in good faith based on a rea-
sonable level of evidence providing sufficient justification at the 
time. These operators believed such instances should still count 
as clearance even if no EO is actually removed. This was the view-
point that prevailed in the TWG despite some concerns about the 
need to minimize clearance of uncontaminated sites. One of the 
benefits of standardizing KPIs such as m²/EO item is that such 
instances will be more easily identifiable as they occur. There may 
be a reasonable explanation as to why no EO was found during 
the clearance of a site. The important thing is to find, document, 
and learn from that explanation. Hopefully instances of clearance 
where nothing is found will become increasingly rare. 
The Common Counting Rules12 outlined in this TNMA are not 
mandated by a shall statement as might be found in a full IMAS. 
However, they have been approved by the IMAS RB. When IMAS 
07.11,13 08.10,14 and 08.2015 are reviewed, these terms will possibly be 
incorporated into that revision, along with the standard updating of 
IMAS 04.10.16 The definitions may be seen as a step on the road to a 
clearer explanation of the key land release outputs, but they are cer-
tainly not the final word. There remains a degree of ambiguity with 
definitions still open to interpretation. How land release outputs are 
reported and counted in the coming years will need to be closely 
monitored to see how well these revised definitions are serving the 
sector. Ultimately definitions for each land release output and activ-
ity will require criteria, at least at a national level, in order to be fully 
transparent. It might be said that until clear criteria are developed 
for land release outputs and activities, they will not be sufficiently 
defined. The development of criteria is an important and overdue 
task for the future.
Figure 4. A deminer processing land by 
means of raking. What constitutes clearance 
was one of the topics subject to debate by 
an IMAS Review Board Technical Working 
Group during the development of this TNMA. 
Further definition will most likely require the 
development of transparent criteria. 
Image courtesy of Roly Evans.
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Determining Cost
Figure 5. A BLU-97 submunition, Iraq. Correctly 
identifying the ordnance model is an example 
of basic data collection required to enable 
meaningful KPIs to analyze field operations. 
Reporting items simply as
“UXOs” into databases is so general
as to be meaningless or 
worse misleading. 
Image courtesy of 
Roly Evans.
Figure 6. Inspection of BETAB-500 concrete-
piercing aerial bombs. It is important such 
items are reported into databases in detail 
and not just as abandoned unexploded 
ordnance (AXO) or worse, misidentified as 
unexploded ordnance (UXO). 
Image courtesy of Roly Evans.
Noticeably absent from the TNMA are any KPIs dealing with cost, 
specifically cost per meter square (cost/m²). Historically this is a dif-
ficult KPI to calculate since there is no Common Counting Rule for the 
cost element of this KPI. It could be that only “operational” costs are 
counted, or that all costs including overhead support costs are calcu-
lated. Fixed price contracts tend to give a clearer view concerning the 
real cost/m², but even in this context figures can be misleading. It could 
be that organizations with a significant existing footprint in a given 
country, where equipment is already procured and imported under a 
previous contract, might be able to artificially reduce their operational 
costs. Some estimate initial deployment costs at 30 percent of a first-
year budget.17 While many donors would welcome a clear common 
counting rule for cost, or maybe a defined disaggregation for different 
cost categories (e.g., operational cost, operational cost minus equip-
ment, overall cost, etc.), it was not possible to agree on a cost/m² during 
the development of this initial TNMA. It is hoped that if this TNMA 
is revised in the future, development of a cost/m² KPI will be possible.
It should be stated clearly that operational KPIs are just a number, or 
a metric, that inform us about our own operations. They are not neces-
sarily targets. If KPIs are used to set targets, that may well be positive, 
but it should be done with a degree of care. Many in mine action are 
aware of targets such as mines destroyed being prioritized in the past. 
In certain circumstances this incentivized clearance of sites where 
there were high volumes of contamination rather than those where a 
higher socioeconomic impact was possible.18 Scenarios such as this are 
not a reason for not using KPIs, they are a reason for using them well.
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Figure 7. An NPA cluster munition remnants survey (CMRS) 
team prepares to move to a new search box in Saravan, Lao 
PDR. CMRS better targets subsequent clearance efforts, 
producing better m²/submunition cleared figures. 
Image courtesy of Roly Evans.
This TNMA should be seen as a starting point. As with all TNMAs, it 
is intended to complement the broader issues and principles addressed 
in IMAS. It also supports a key element of the 2019 Oslo Action Plan 
that made multiple references to the importance of analyzing good 
quality data.19 Until now, IMAS have had no agreed standard definition 
of performance or standard way of measuring performance. This has 
had an impact on how well we can analyze and subsequently improve 
our operations. This TNMA should at least start to address this issue. 
It is in no way a final word on how we collect operational data and 
analyze it. In its simplest form the TNMA can be seen as a list of sug-
gested KPIs that mine action operators, national mine action authori-
ties, and donors can consider when analyzing operations. However, in 
many ways its main focus is improving the quality of data on which 
KPIs are based, enabling a real analysis of that data by operations staff. 
Doing so while recognizing the context, even in a limited way, is key. 
For without good quality data counted in a standardized way, KPIs can 
actually be misleading. Hopefully this TNMA will contribute towards 
development and use of suitable KPIs that are not misleading and that 
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